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Abstract
Many economists and policy-makers argue that households do not save enough
to maintain an adequate standard of living during retirement. However, there is
no consensus on the answer to the underlying question what this standard should
be, despite the fact that it is crucial for the design of saving incentives and pen-
sion reforms. We address this question with a survey, individually tailored to each
respondent’s financial situation, conducted both in the U.S. and the Netherlands.
Key findings are that adequate levels of retirement spending exceed 70 percent of
working life spending, and minimum acceptable replacement rates depend strongly
on income.
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1 Introduction
What level of spending during retirement do people consider desirable, given their lifetime
budget constraints? How does this level compare to spending during working life? Is there
a minimum level of retirement spending which people want to maintain at all costs? How
much risk are individuals ready to bear in exchange for a higher expected standard of
living during retirement? Finally, how do desired standards of living during retirement
vary across the population?
The answers to these questions provide a sound benchmark level for an adequate
standard of living during retirement and are thus important for three policy issues. First,
such a benchmark level allows us to address a concern expressed by many economists and
policy-makers: whether people are adequately prepared for retirement.1 Second, such a
benchmark may serve as advice to individuals who find determining an adequate level of
retirement savings themselves difficult. Third, such a benchmark is highly informative for
the many countries around the globe that are currently considering reforming their pension
systems, since any pension reform plan requires information about adequate benefit levels.
Several approaches for addressing the opening questions of this paper already exist.
One approach is to assume that a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility func-
tion can approximate individuals’ preferences. Making specific assumptions about the
parameters of this function as well as about other relevant variables such as interest rates
and equity returns allows for calibrating optimal consumption choices during old age and
during working life. According to this approach, which we dub the calibration approach,
actual observed choices are considered adequate if they come sufficiently close to these
calibrated choices.2 A second approach to operationalizing the notion of an adequate
level of retirement spending is to refer to certain benchmark replacement rates relating
to either income or spending. Third, one may refer to poverty thresholds.
1See Bernheim (1992), Bernheim et al. (2000), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Munnell et al. (2006),
Skinner (2007), and Thaler (1994).
2See Scholz et al. (2006) for an impressive application of this methodology.
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None of these approaches is without problems. Clearly, any a priori chosen bench-
mark for a replacement rate, such as 70 or 80 percent, is ad hoc. Furthermore, in the
presence of risk, it is not clear whether such a benchmark refers to the expected value
or some other point in the distribution of possibly realized replacement rates. Concern-
ing poverty thresholds, there are several different concepts of these thresholds, and the
exact definition of the poverty line is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. While of obvious
interest and conceptually very elegant, the preference-based calibration approach is also
fraught with problems. How confident can we feel that individuals’ true preferences can
be approximated by a CRRA utility function with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of,
say, 3? Why not 12?3 How confident can we feel about the assumption that, for CRRA
preferences, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution? Furthermore, how large is the bias introduced by not
accounting for the complementarity or substitutability between leisure and consumption?
And if we were to take this into account, how should we calibrate this trade-off? There
are a plethora of questions and we still know only very little about their answers.
It may seem that the problems of the calibration approach could be avoided by a
revealed preference approach. This would entail an econometric analysis of individuals’
observed retirement preparation choices which, in turn, would allow for inference of their
preferences, such as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. However, an inherent problem
with this procedure is that people’s actual retirement preparation choices may not be
in their best self-interest. This may be due to the fact that individuals simply adopt
defaults (Beshears et al., 2006), lack the willpower to save sufficiently (Thaler, 1994), or
lack financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij et al., 2007a).4 In fact, as is
demonstrated by Skinner (2007), the determination of an appropriate savings plan that
implements a given life cycle consumption profile is highly complex. As a result, inferring
3As put by Poterba et al. (2003), “within the framework of parametric CRRA utility functions, there
is little consensus on the ‘correct’ value of the relative risk aversion coefficient” (p. 26).
4See Beshears et al. (2008) for a more complete discussion.
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individuals’ true preferences from their observed retirement preparation choices might be
inappropriate. Furthermore, inferring people’s true preferences from their actual choices
would be difficult, even in the absence of this concern, since the actual choices may be
constrained by the presence of a mandatory pension system.5
The novel approach we pursue in this paper is to address the questions raised in the first
paragraph by means of a specifically designed internet survey module which we conduct
with the American Life Panel (ALP) at RAND in the U.S., and with the CentERpanel
(CP) in the Netherlands. The U.S. embodies a country where individuals bear a substan-
tial amount of responsibility for their own retirement preparation, while the Netherlands
are a country with a typical European-style welfare state and a pension system that offers
generous replacement rates. In particular, the after-tax income replacement rate for an
average earner amounts to about 85 percent in the Netherlands. In contrast, it amounts
to only about 50 percent in the U.S. (OECD, 2007). It is therefore of interest to inves-
tigate whether notions of an adequate standard of living during retirement differ across
such contrasting institutional setups, and if so to what degree.
Our survey approach is further inspired by the idea that, in a liberal society, it would
be a priori desirable to base any notion of an adequate standard of living during retirement
on individuals’ own views. As discussed above, we have good reasons for believing that
people may not be technically able to implement their most preferred consumption profile
over the life cycle. However, this does clearly not imply that people do not know what they
want. In order to avoid any premature paternalism, we therefore should not prematurely
discard the idea that people may in principle know what consumption profile they find
desirable (Beshears et al., 2008).6
5This is a particular concern for many European countries whose pension systems offer relatively high
replacement rates (see OECD, 2007).
6An example may help to make our argument clearer. Many people would not be able to construct
their preferred car. Nevertheless, people may know what car they like. In a similar way, people may not
be able to technically implement the financial choices that lead to, say, a spending replacement rate of 70
percent. But this may not imply that individuals do not have meaningful preferences over intertemporal
consumption streams.
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Two features of our approach to elicit preferences over retirement spending profiles
stand out. First, we go to great length to make all our survey questions as simple and
as meaningful to respondents as possible. Specifically, we tailor the survey questions
individually to each respondent’s financial situation, based on prior information about
variables such as total household income. Tailoring the questions to each respondent’s
own financial situation reduces the cognitive load and makes the questions meaningful in
the context of the respondent’s personal situation. Furthermore, none of our questions
requires respondents to understand any technical aspects of retirement preparation such
as the effects of compound interest and inflation. Second, three types of observations
provide evidence that our survey indeed yields useful information about people’s life cycle
preferences: (i) This evidence comes from responses to feedback questions which we ask
at the end of the survey; (ii), we include various randomization treatments and find that
they do not affect response behavior in any way; and (iii), there are highly meaningful
relationships between respondents’ choices and socioeconomic variables.
Our main findings are as follows. First, neglecting any risk associated with retirement
spending, we find that ex-ante desirable ratios of old age to working-life spending exceed
70 percent. This applies to both the U.S. and the Netherlands. Second, we investigate
the lower limits on old age spending below which individuals would not want to fall in any
case. We use information on these lower limits to calibrate minimum income replacement
rates for each income quintile. For the U.S., these minimum replacement rates amount to
about 100 percent for respondents in the lowest income quintile and gradually decrease
to about 50 percent for respondents in the top income quintile. In the Netherlands, this
gradient is much weaker and minimum replacement rates decrease from 70 percent for the
first quintile to 60 percent for the fifth income quintile. Third, we elicit the parameter
of relative risk aversion within a retirement preparation context. Our results show that
risk aversion is much higher in the Netherlands than in the U.S. The median coefficient
of relative risk aversion amounts to 4 for the U.S. and to 7 for the Netherlands. Our data
5
also emphasize that researchers need to take a high degree of individual heterogeneity
with respect to the risk aversion parameter into account.
A related study that has made use of the Dutch CP in order to examine adequate
pension design is van Rooij et al. (2007b). This study investigates whether respondents
prefer a mandatory pension system over a privatized one with a free choice of contribution
rates and asset allocation strategies. Furthermore, it explores whether respondents show a
preference for a defined benefit system with income guarantees over a defined contribution
system. The main difference to our study is that we examine various aspects of individual
preferences over standards of living rather than preferences over features of pension design.
Seminal survey studies of preference elicitation in the domain of intertemporal choice
and choice under risk are Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al. (2001), Kapteyn and
Teppa (2003), and Kimball et al. (2006). Our analysis also differs from these studies in
various respects. First, our corresponding survey questions are more specific in that we
concentrate only on intertemporal and risk preferences as far as they relate to retirement
preparation. Second, our questionnaire is individually tailored to each respondent’s per-
sonal financial situation. Third, we present results for two different countries. Given the
stark difference in pension institutions between those countries, our comparison allows for
judging our results’ robustness across different institutional settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information about
our samples. Section 3 presents our results on ex-ante adequate old age spending in the
absence of risk. Section 4 brings risk into play. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Data
The Dutch CentERpanel. The Dutch CentERpanel (CP) is hosted by the data col-
lection agency CentERdata at Tilburg University, and the data used for the presented
analysis is publicly available from CentERdata. The CP consists of a total of about
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2000 members who regularly fill out internet-based questionnaires, typically on weekends.
There are two types of questionnaires. First, panel members are regularly asked about so-
cioeconomic characteristics of their household within the framework of the so-called DNB
Household Survey. We use this information to tailor our questions to the respondent’s
personal financial situation. Second, panel members are invited to answer special-topic
questionnaire modules such as ours from time to time.
An outstanding feature of the CP is that it is representative for the overall Dutch
population. Since internet penetration may be systematically lower in some subgroups of
the population, CentERdata provides households that do not own a computer or internet
connection with an add-on device that allows them to access internet via television. It
also provides a television if necessary.
Our questionnaire was conducted on the weekend of March 24/25, 2007, and was again
presented one weekend later to those who did not respond on the previous weekend. We
presented the survey to panel members who were older than 25 and who were either
the household’s main breadwinner or his or her spouse. We also included retired panel
members, though some questions were deliberately only asked to non-retired respondents.
Based on these selection criteria, 835 panel members answered our questionnaire. The
actual number of responses per question varies between 550 and 835.
The American Life Panel. The American Life Panel (ALP) at the RAND institu-
tion was modeled after the CP, and grants public access to the data used in this paper. As
in the case of the CP, ALP members regularly answer questions on general socioeconomic
characteristics. The main difference between the ALP and the CP is that the former is
not fully representative of the overall U.S. population. Second, ALP members are not
limited to answering a particular questionnaire during a particular weekend, but typically
may do so during an entire month.
In the case of the ALP, our questionnaire was fielded in November 2007. Using selection
criteria similar to those for the CP, 847 panel members answered our questionnaire. The
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actual number of responses per question varies between about 600 and 847.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our two samples. The income variable refers
to total household income after taxes. Our measure of gross total wealth includes hous-
ing wealth, but it excludes (financial) retirement savings. In all our analyses, wealth
data enter in the form of wealth quintile dummies. The respondents’ highest degree of
professional education is indicated by the two dummy variables “no vocational training”
and “university degree”. The excluded category is the middle one, i.e. if both dummy
variables are zero, the corresponding respondent’s highest professional degree is a voca-
tional degree. The variable “children at home” indicates whether any children are living
at the respondent’s home. The figures in Table 1 show that ALP respondents are richer,
wealthier and better educated than the average American.
3 Adequate Old Age Spending in the Absence of Risk
We address the question of what represents an adequate standard of living during retire-
ment from an ex-ante anticipatory perspective. This is the perspective that corresponds
to a preference-based approach which basically underlies all of standard economic theory.
From the ex-ante perspective, the question of what represents an adequate standard of
living during retirement intrinsically relates to two key trade-offs. The first trade-off is
between spending during working life and spending during old age. The second trade-off is
between a safe but lower level of old age spending, and a more risky level of spending with
a higher expected value. The importance of these trade-offs notwithstanding, there may
also be a minimum level of retirement spending below which individuals would not want
to fall even in exchange for very high levels of working life or expected old age spending.7
This discussion highlights the three main topics of our questionnaire, namely the in-
7This would, for instance, be the case for habit formation or Stone-Geary type preferences over
intertemporal consumption flows, as well as for the lexicographic loss aversion framework in Binswanger
(2007).
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tertemporal trade-off, the risk-return trade-off, and the potential existence of a lower
bound on acceptable old age spending levels. We start our discussion with the intertem-
poral trade-off, since this is the most basic aspect of retirement preparation from an
economist’s point of view.
In the interest of keeping our questionnaire as transparent and simple as possible, our
survey questions on the intertemporal trade-off neglects any form of risk. Furthermore,
we do not consider any variation of spending within working life or within retirement.
This would lead to rather difficult questions and, as a consequence, would reduce the
reliability of respondents’ answers. Hence, we concentrate on how average spending levels
during retirement compare to average spending levels during working life.
Specifically, we present each respondent i a total number of six options of monthly
working-life and retirement spending levels
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
, k = 1, 2, . . . , 6. The consumption
levels ckw,i, c
k
r,i represent absolute amounts. Respondents are asked to indicate which option
they like most. The defining property of each option is the ratio ckr,i/c
k
w,i, which we set
at 50, 64, 76, 88, 100, and 140 percent for k = 1, 2, . . . , 6, respectively. This includes
the range of spending ratios that are commonly viewed as potentially adequate. All six
options are characterized by an identical present value of lifetime consumption, according
to a stylized calculation outlined below.
It is important to stress that we show respondents absolute amounts of money, not per-
centages. We do so since respondents may find imagining exactly what these percentage
numbers would mean for their personal situation difficult. We do not inform respondents
that the ratios ckr,i/c
k
w,i correspond to the particular percentage numbers mentioned above.
The calculation used for determining the present value of total lifetime income and
consumption is not intended to be realistic per se. Rather, we want respondents to
perceive the options
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
as feasible in light of their personal financial situations. In
particular, our lifetime income calculation is carried out in such a way that the highest
value of ckw,i comes close to a respondent’s total monthly household income during working
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life.
Specifically, we assume that the respondent’s working life starts at the age of 25.
Furthermore, we assume respondents retire at age 65 in case of the ALP and at 61 in case
of the CP.8 We neglect mortality risk and assume that death occurs with certainty after
age 85.9
The present value of consumption over the entire life is then given by
R−1∑
t=25
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
12 ckw,i +
85∑
t=R
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
12 ckr,i = PV Yi.
R denotes the retirement age and amounts to either 65 or 61. r denotes the real risk-free
interest rate. (Respondents are first asked to choose their favorite spending profile for an
interest rate of one percent and then for an interest rate of six percent.) PV Yi denotes a
hypothetical present value of lifetime income for respondent i. It is determined according
to
PV Yi =
R−1∑
t=25
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
Yi +
85∑
t=R
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
0.64 Yi.
Yi represents respondent i’s total annual household income after taxes, as we observe it
before conducting our survey module.10
Our calculation of PV Yi implicitly assumes that retirement income equals 64 percent
of working-life income. This allows us to make the options appear realistic to respondents.
This can be seen as follows. Suppose that ckr,i/c
k
w,i < .64. In this case, our assumptions
would imply that ckw,i > Yi/12. Thus, the respondent would have to borrow, hypothet-
8In the U.S., Social Security benefits can be claimed beginning at age 62. The normal retirement age
varies between 65 and 67 depending on the year of birth. In the Netherlands, first-pillar benefits can be
claimed from the age of 60 on, while the normal retirement age is 65. Effective retirement ages are 64
and 61 for the U.S. and the Netherlands, respectively (OECD, 2006).
9According to the 2008 OASDI Trustees Report (OASDI, 2008), life expectancy at age 65 currently
amounts to 81.7 for men and 84.2 for women. It is expected to increase to 84.3 for men and to 86.4 for
women in 2050.
10For retired respondents we set Yi to total annual household income after taxes divided by 0.85, in
order to take the fact that their pre-retirement income was likely to be higher than their current income
into account.
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ically, if she were to “realize” this option. In contrast, if ckr,i/c
k
w,i ≥ .64, then we have
ckw,i ≤ Yi/12. In particular, for a ratio of 64 percent we approximately have c
k
w,i = Yi/12,
up to rounding. Thus, our assumptions about PV Yi imply that none of the values for c
k
w,i
exceed respondents’ monthly income except when ckr,i/c
k
w,i = .5.
Our question on spending profiles was split up into two steps/screens. On a first
screen, respondents only saw four options corresponding to spending ratios of 64, 76, 88,
and 100 percent, respectively. This was meant to avoid respondents having to process an
excessive amount of information on one screen. Thus, all options on the first screen ex-
clude hypothetical borrowing. In this way, we avoid alienating respondents with numbers
which may appear infeasible to them. Given the avoidance of hypothetical borrowing,
the numbers for ckw,i come as close as possible to respondents’ monthly income. Only if a
respondent chooses a ratio of 64 or 100 percent do we ask on a follow-up screen if he or
she would actually prefer the chosen option to that associated with a ratio of 50 or 140
percent, respectively.11
In order to facilitate information processing, all values of
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
are rounded to
entire multiples of 50 or 20 units of the corresponding currency, depending on the magni-
tude of Yi. (Remember that we show respondents absolute values, not percentages.) The
introductory text to our spending profile questions is as follows:
Below you find four options of how you could spend your money over your
lifetime. For each option the first column indicates how much your household
could spend on average per month from age 25 until retirement. Thus, this
refers to your total (working) age from age 25 until retirement, not just the
remaining (working) age. The second column indicates how much your house-
hold could spend during retirement. Please think of all your expenditures, such
as food, clothing, accommodation, insurance, traveling etc. Assume that the
11We could have chosen a “replacement rate” of 50 instead of 64 percent in our calculation of PV Yi.
However, this would have pushed the values of ckw,i for all but the 50 percent option quite far away from
Yi/12.
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numbers below show what you can spend after having already paid for taxes.
Assume also that prices of the things you spend your money on remain the
same in the future as today (no inflation). If you had a choice, which option
would you like most? 12
Table 2 shows an example of a table with the actual options appearing below the
above text. In the case of Table 2, the numbers correspond to a monthly household
income after taxes of 3,000 U.S. dollars. Table 2 refers to an interest rate of one percent.
After having indicated their favorite profile, respondents are presented with a second
table, corresponding to an interest rate of six percent. In this table, the ratios of the
spending levels are identical. However, for a higher interest rate, achieving a given level
of retirement spending requires giving up less working-life spending. As a result, the
distances between the numbers in the first column are smaller and the distances in the
second column are larger.
It is important to stress that a respondent choosing her most-preferred profile
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
from Table 2 need not have an understanding of compound interest rate calculations, in-
flation or any other technical detail. Respondents only need a well-defined preference
ordering over the different spending profiles. The fact that individuals have such a prefer-
ence ordering is probably the key assumption in economics and we adopt this assumption
for our analysis here.13
The results are shown in Table 3. The key observations are the following. First,
irrespective of the sample and the level of the interest rate, only very few respondents
preferred a spending profile corresponding to a ratio of 50 or 64 percent. Second, there is
substantial mass concentrated on the options corresponding to spending ratios of 76, 88,
12For single households and respondents that are already retired the text is adapted accordingly.
13This assumption is, of course, very different from the assumption that individuals would be able to
implement their most preferred spending profile. Behavioral economists have identified several reasons
why individuals may be unable to implement the choices that are in their best self-interest. These include
financial illiteracy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij et al., 2007a) and procrastination (see Beshears
et al., 2008).
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and 100 percent. Third, the 140 percent option is very popular in the U.S., but not in the
Netherlands, at an interest rate of one percent. Finally, consistent with basic economic
theory, the 140 percent option is much more popular for an interest rate of six percent
than for an interest rate of one percent in both countries.
The differences in the distributions of preferred spending ratios between the two sam-
ples are statistically significant.14 This mainly reflects the fact that the 140 percent
option is much more popular in the U.S. Two explanations may be put forward for this
fact. First, U.S. respondents may expect to face higher out-of-pocket costs for medical
treatments and nursing homes (see footnote 21 below). Second, Americans may find post-
poning consumption until retirement as a complement to leisure more desirable. This is
consistent with the fact that the number of vacation days is typically much lower in the
U.S. than in the Netherlands.15 As a result, people working in the U.S. may find delaying
spending power until retirement – when they have the time to enjoy leisure – preferable.
Based on our data, we have no means for investigating the second explanation. How-
ever, our survey allows us to shed some light on the first one. If respondents who choose
an increasing spending profile did so in anticipation of high out-of-pocket medical costs,
we should also expect these respondents to indicate a particularly high level of old age
spending below which they may not want to fall at all costs. Since our survey also con-
tains a question on such a minimum acceptable level of old age spending (see Section
4.1), we can test this hypothesis. We do not find that respondents that choose a spending
ratio of 140 percent indicate a systematically higher level of a minimally acceptable old
age spending level. Thus, the choice of a spending ratio of 140 percent may reflect a
preference for an increasing spending profile rather than exposure to a high amount of
risk.
A very interesting question is whether the choice of a particular spending profile sys-
14Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, equality is rejected at the 1-percent significance level.
15In 2005, the number of annual hours worked per worker amounted to about 1,900 in the U.S. and
about 1,400 in the Netherlands (OECD, 2008).
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tematically relates to respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics. We explore this by
regressing the spending ratio corresponding to the chosen spending profile on a range
of explanatory variables including the respondent’s income and wealth quintiles, an age
polynomial, as well as all other general household characteristics shown in Table 1. In
the case of the ALP, no single variable is significantly related to the chosen spending
profile. Specifically, we find that a variable indicating people’s retirement status has nei-
ther an economically nor a statistically significant effect, indicating that choices do not
differ between those who are retired and those who are not retired. In the case of the
CP, households that have children as well as those with a university degree are found to
prefer a marginally lower spending ratio.16 All these findings are very robust across many
different specifications of OLS and ordered probit regressions. We therefore conclude
that the heterogeneity of respondents’ answers reflects, to a major extent, pure preference
heterogeneity, not heterogeneity with respect to socioeconomic characteristics.
One concern with our questions on preferred spending profiles may be whether respon-
dents really understand that the spending levels associated with working life refer to the
entire working life, not just to their remaining working life. If not, then older respondents
may find it desirable to choose a profile with a high spending ratio. This would then imply
that age is significantly related to respondents’ choices. Regardless of the order of the age
polynomial, the included age variables are neither jointly nor individually significant in
any of our regressions. This leads us to the conclusion that respondents clearly were able
to understand our questions.
In order to explore whether respondents indicate choices that relate to their true pref-
erences, we randomized the order of the response options. Respondents were randomly
assigned to one of two treatments. Half of the respondents saw the numbers arranged in
the order as in Table 2, where the order of the spending ratios is decreasing. The other
16Results are available upon request. In case of the CP, households with children living at home or
with a university degree choose a spending ratio that is about five percent lower, everything else being
equal.
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half saw the numbers arranged with an increasing order of spending ratios. In order to
investigate the effects of these randomization treatments, we include a dummy variable
indicating the order in which the response options are arranged in all regressions for pre-
ferred spending ratios discussed above. The resulting coefficients of the randomization
dummy are always insignificant and very small. Furthermore, the inclusion of the dummy
does not change the coefficients of the other included variables. As an additional formal
test of the answer quality, we estimate models that are fully interacted with the ran-
domization dummy. The corresponding F-tests for the joint significance of all interaction
terms are insignificant for both the CP and the ALP.
To further explore the quality of the respondents’ answers, we make use of three vari-
ables which we treat as measures of the degree to which respondents provide “informed”
answers. At the end of our questionnaire we ask respondents to indicate whether or not
they agree with the following statements:17
1. Many questions didn’t make sense to me.
2. Many questions were too abstract for me.
3. I find it very difficult to imagine how much money I would want to have during
retirement.
Respondents may check either of the options (1) fully disagree, (2) somewhat disagree,
(3) somewhat agree, (4) fully agree. The percentage of respondents who either fully or
somewhat disagree amounts to 71, 62, and 75 percent for the three statements, respec-
tively, for the ALP. For the CP the corresponding numbers are 58, 45, and 18 percent,
respectively.18 We use the answers to the above question to group respondents into an
17It has been observed that respondents sometimes show a tendency to agree when asked to rate a
particular statement (Clark and Schober, 1992). To set bars high, we therefore ask respondents whether
our questions did not make sense to them. Moreover, we also randomized the ordering of the four answer
categories of these questions, and we did not find any significant impact on response behavior based on
the corresponding Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for distributional differences.
18The reason that most likely explains why ALP respondents have a clearer idea of the standard of
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“informed” and a “less informed” subgroup. As before, whatever tests we run, we find
that being a member of the informed group never affects response behavior in any signif-
icant way, i.e. the coefficients on dummy variables indicating informed respondents are
insignificant in all regressions that we consider.19 We view this as an indication that even
respondents who feel somewhat less at ease with our questions provide us with meaningful
answers.
Overall, we draw two main conclusions from the results discussed in this section. First,
individual preferences are fairly heterogeneous. Second, in spite of this, most respondents
agree that spending profiles that correspond to ratios below 70 percent do not seem
desirable. This applies to both the Netherlands and the U.S. We thus infer from this
that adequate spending ratios should exceed at least 70 percent. In the case that old age
spending is exposed to risk, this would mean that the certainty equivalence value of old
age spending should exceed at least 70 percent of working-life spending.
4 Bringing Risk into Play
We consider risk from two different perspectives. First, we conceptualize risk from the
perspective of a lower limit on old age spending below which an individual would not
want to fall below in almost any case. This represents a particularly simple framework
for thinking about risk since it does not require evaluating any risk-return trade-off. Such
a framework corresponds to the logic of poverty thresholds as well as to preferences with
habit formation or Stone-Geary utility functions.20 Information on such a minimum ac-
ceptable level of old age spending is very useful for thinking about adequate retirement
preparation. It specifies a benchmark spending level that an individual may want to ex-
living during retirement that they envisage is that institutions in the U.S. require individuals to take
much more own responsibility for their retirement preparation. This may induce people to think more
carefully about their retirement needs. In the Netherlands, a typical worker belongs to a mandatory
defined benefit scheme that typically offers an after-tax replacement rate of above 80 percent.
19Results are available upon request.
20See Binswanger (2007).
16
ceed, from an ex-ante point of view, with a very high probability. Thus, such a benchmark
helps to identify adequate asset allocation strategies for individual retirement accounts.
It also implies an overall lower bound on adequate savings for retirement.
Second, we are interested in how respondents evaluate potential risk-return trade-offs.
We therefore also include a standard set of questions for identifying coefficients of relative
risk aversion. The innovation here is that we elicit this parameter strictly in the context
of retirement preparation and that the options respondents may choose between are again
tailored to their personal financial situation.
This section starts with the analysis of lower bounds on old age spending.
4.1 Lower Limits on Adequate Old Age Spending
We present respondents the following question.
This question refers to the overall level of spending that applies to you and
your partner during retirement. What is a minimal level of monthly spending
that you never want to fall below during retirement, at all costs? Please think
of all your expenditures, such as food, clothing, accommodation, insurance etc.
Assume that prices of the things you spend your money on remain the same
in the future as today (no inflation).
The question is framed in a way that we should expect answers to differ across different
countries if they are characterized by different institutions. For instance, the answers to
this question may differ between countries with different health insurance schemes.21
21In contrast to the U.S., health insurance is compulsory for everyone in the Netherlands and pays for
most doctor visits and pharmaceuticals as well as for hospital stays up to one year. Furthermore, every
resident is covered by a public long-term care insurance scheme (dubbed AWBZ) that covers nursing
homes and long-term hospital stays. The U.S. Medicare system requires a 20 percent copayment for
hospital stays, a feature that has no counterpart in the Netherlands. Covering this copayment requires an
extra (non-mandatory) so-called Medigap insurance. (The requirement of a copayment drops if Medicaid
covers care costs.)
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For the ALP, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the answers amount to 2,000,
3,000, and 4,000 year-2007 U.S. dollars per month, respectively. The 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the ratio of the answers to total monthly household income after taxes
amount to .48, .73, and .95, respectively. For the CP, the respective absolute numbers are
1,200, 1,600, and 2,000 year-2007 euros per month. The respective ratios of the answers
to total household income after taxes are .56, .72, and .88.
Table 4 shows median regressions with the answers to the above question as the de-
pendent variable.22 Our estimation results show that income primarily determines the
minimally acceptable spending level.23 In particular, minimum spending levels neither
depend in a statistically significant way on age, regardless of the order of the age poly-
nomial, nor on whether children live at home. This latter result means that neither the
current family situation nor the current age systematically affects the way respondents
anticipate their retirement needs. This is exactly what we should expect if respondents
rationally anticipate their retirement needs. We view the fact that we actually do observe
this pattern as an indication of the quality of our responses.
Interestingly, retired respondents are significantly more conservative with respect to
their minimum needs in the Netherlands. In contrast, respondents with a university
degree are less conservative. It is noteworthy that the regression results in Table 4 are
highly robust across many different specifications that we have estimated.24
The regression results in Table 4 allow for calibrating minimum acceptable spending
levels for any combination of household characteristics we may be interested in. Since our
results show income to be clearly the most important determinant for minimum spending
levels, we calibrate such spending levels for each income quintile. We do so for a non-
22Given the skewness of the data, we prefer median regressions to OLS, since a median regression
imposes less restrictive assumptions and therefore is a more robust estimation method.
23For the ALP, the dummy variables indicating income quintiles do not refer to the quintiles according
to our sample but according to the Current Population Survey. Since the ALP is not representative for
the U.S. population, this makes it easier to interpret the results. For the CP, the quintiles refer to our
sample.
24These are available upon request.
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single household aged 60 that is not retired.25 Furthermore, we set the values of the
dummy variables for children, home ownership, no vocational training, and for having
a university degree to zero. Concerning wealth, we assign to each income quintile that
particular wealth quintile to which the median member of a particular income quintile
belongs to.
The results for these calibrations are shown in Table 5. The upper panel refers to the
ALP and the measurement units are year-2007 U.S. dollars. The lower panel refers to the
CP and the units are year-2007 euros. The first column in each of the two panels in Table
5 shows the calibrated monthly minimum spending levels. The second column simply
reports the monthly median after-tax incomes in our samples for each income quintile.
The striking pattern in Table 5 is that the increments in minimum spending levels are
smaller than the increments in income. This pattern is particularly pronounced for the
U.S., which is reflected in the decreasing ratios of spending levels to incomes, as shown
in the third column of Table 5. In the U.S., the minimum spending-to-income ratio is
even slightly higher than one for the first quintile. This suggests that households in our
first quintile have serious problems making ends meet. This is substantiated by the fact
that the median monthly income of households in our first income quintile (see Table 5) is
already far below the poverty threshold in the U.S. which is 1,129 U.S. dollars per month
for two-person households and 1,378 U.S. dollars for three-person households.26
For all other quintiles in case of the U.S., and for all quintiles in the Netherlands,
the calibrated replacement rates are below one. This suggests that people anticipate that
they would be able to cut back if necessary. This result is consistent with the recent
finding of Aguiar and Hurst (2007) that the elderly spend less money for a given amount
of “consumption intake”.
25Almost identical results are obtained for ages of 40 or 50.
26These poverty thresholds refer to the year 2007 and are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, see:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh07.html.
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What do we further learn from Table 5? Our calibrations are useful in two further
respects. First, they prove helpful in designing adequate asset allocation strategies. Any
asset allocation strategy maps into a distribution of available resources during retirement.
Our calibrations help identify adequate portfolio strategies in that, say, the 90th percentile
of the resulting distribution of monthly spending should exceed the values in the first
column of Table 5. Second, the numbers in Table 5 may be useful for thinking about
adequate benefit levels in a mandatory pension system. If society believes that pension
systems should be mandatory since individuals may not have enough information or self-
control in the domain of retirement preparation, then the numbers in the first column of
Table 5 may provide useful benchmarks for income-specific benefit levels provided by a
mandatory system.
Clearly, adequate old age spending levels depend on institutional settings within a
particular country. In this sense, our results are only suggestive for countries other than
the U.S. and the Netherlands. The discussion in this section provides guidelines on how
other countries may proceed in order to learn about citizens’ perceptions of minimally
adequate old age spending levels when conducting surveys of their own.
As in the case of spending profiles discussed in the last section, we conclude this sec-
tion with the investigation of whether we can judge respondents’ answers as informed and
reliable. As described in Section 3, we therefore classify respondents into an informed and
a less informed subgroup. Once again, we find no significant difference in response behav-
ior between either subgroup. This holds for all three information measures. In particular,
if dummy variables indicating the less informed subgroup are added as explanatory vari-
ables in the regressions discussed in this section, e.g. the regressions reported in Table
4, they are never significant and they do not have any effect on the coefficients of the
remaining explanatory variables.
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4.2 Relative Risk Aversion
Our final question elicits the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We employ the widely-
used multiple price list design of Holt and Laury (2002). Specifically, respondents are
presented with the following question.
In the following table we present five choices to you. You can always choose
between two different types of income during retirement, income of type A
and of type B. Please assume that these incomes include all sources of money
available to you during retirement. In particular, there is no additional money
available from spending down your wealth. If you choose income type A, the
total income during retirement for you and your partner will always be [Zsi ]
per month, independent of the performance of the economy. If you choose
type B, the total income during retirement for you and your partner depends
on the performance of the economy (e.g. on returns in financial markets).
If the economic performance is unfavorable it will be [Zrli ] per month. If the
performance is favorable it will be [Zrhi ] per month. The five choices differ only
in terms of the chance that the favorable or unfavorable economic performance
will materialize. Which income type would you choose?
A: [Zsi ] Euros, or
B: [1− pi] percent chance of [Zrli ], and [pi] percent chance of [Z
rh
i ].
(. . .)
The probability pi is set to 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 percent for the five choice situations,
respectively. We set Zsi to 85 percent of a respondent’s current monthly income, Z
rl
i
to 70 and Zrhi to 100 percent of her current monthly income. However, it is important
to stress that, as in the case of risk-free spending ratios in Section 3, respondents see
absolute money values and are not made aware that these values correspond to particular
replacement rates. All values are again rounded to entire multiples of 50 or 20 units of
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the corresponding currency, depending on their magnitude.
Under CRRA preferences, expected utility of a random prospect x˜ is defined as
U (x˜) = E
[
1
1− θ
x˜1−θ
]
,
where θ denotes the parameter of relative risk aversion and E the mathematical expec-
tation operator. We identify the value of θ for each respondent by using information
on her switching point. Specifically, respondents indicate whether they would prefer the
safe option (A) or the risky option (B) when the probability for the high realization as-
sociated with the risky option amounts to 50, 60, 70, 80, or 90 percent, respectively.
If, for instance, a respondent prefers the safe option in the case of 60 percent and the
risky option in case of 70 percent, his switch point is given by the 70-percent prospect.
We then know that 1/ (1− θ) (Zsi )
1−θ
≥ 0.4/ (1− θ)
(
Zrli
)1−θ
+ 0.6/ (1− θ)
(
Zrhi
)1−θ
but
1/ (1− θ) (Zsi )
1−θ
≤ 0.3/ (1− θ)
(
Zrli
)1−θ
+ 0.7/ (1− θ)
(
Zrhi
)1−θ
. This allows us to iden-
tify the highest value of θ that is consistent with the respondent’s switching point.27
For the ALP, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the observed distribution of θ
are 2, 4 and 7, respectively. For the CP they amount to 4, 7, and 12. Figures 1 and 2
show estimated kernel densities for both samples.28 Clearly, the Dutch respondents are
far more risk averse than the U.S. respondents. However, Figures 1 and 2 show that
there is also considerable heterogeneity within each country. This is an important result
for calibration studies aiming to identify optimal retirement saving and asset allocation
strategies as well as an optimal design of a mandatory pension system. It indicates the
importance of taking individual preference heterogeneity into account.
27Identical with Holt and Laury (2002), we use the (last) point where a subject switches from option A
to option B. The vast majority of our respondents (95 percent for the CP, and 94 percent for the ALP)
only switches once. As in Holt and Laury (2002), we find that the analysis reported here does not change
if we drop respondents who switch from B back to A.
28An Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986) for bandwidth selection
have been used for the kernel density estimation.
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We are also interested in the question whether socioeconomic background charac-
teristics are systematically related to respondents’ risk aversion. We do not identify any
systematic relationship, neither in the ALP nor in the CP.29 The fact that CP respondents
are substantially more risk averse than ALP respondents may have several explanations.
First, it may reflect that the ALP is less representative for the general population than
the CP. Second, institutions may be such that they are more likely to favor risk-taking
in the U.S. Third, the effect may be cultural. Since ALP respondents are wealthier and
better educated than the average American, the first explanation would require that in-
come, wealth, or education be positively associated with measured relative risk aversion.
However, we do not find any such statistically significant associations. The second expla-
nation would entail the U.S. social insurance system covering more risks than its Dutch
counterpart. This is clearly not the case. This renders the third explanation the most
likely one.
As before, we also investigate response quality. First, the order of the response options
was randomized. If we regress θ on the usual socioeconomic variables (see Table 1) and
include a dummy that indicates the randomization treatment, this dummy is always
insignificant and its inclusion does not change the coefficients of the other regressors.
This result holds for other specifications, e.g. specifications with only subsets of the
socioeconomic variables. We also estimate models where the randomization dummy is
fully interacted with all other explanatory variables. Further underlining our observation
that the order of response options does not play a role, an F-test on joint significance of
all interaction terms is insignificant for the ALP. The F-test is significant for the CP, but
the significance vanishes as soon as we stratify the sample by retirement status. Second,
we investigate whether the degree to which respondents feel informed (which we elicited
based on three questions asked at the end of the survey, see Section 3) systematically
affects respondent’s answers. Fully in line with all our previously reported results, we
29Regression results, again containing all variables presented in Table 1, are available upon request.
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do not find any such evidence. Dummies indicating informed respondents are always
insignificant and their inclusion does not affect the coefficients of the other regressors.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a specifically designed internet survey conducted in the U.S. and the
Netherlands to address the question of what represents an adequate standard of living
during old age. We address this question from an ex-ante point of view, consistent with the
perspective suggested by economic theory. A series of randomization treatments as well
as various feedback questions show that there is little reason to doubt that respondents’
answers to our questionnaire are highly meaningful. Our findings further indicate that
respondents are able to look beyond their current household situation when answering
our questions about an adequate standard of living during retirement. Overall, people
seem to have a fairly good idea of the level of old age spending that they find desirable.
We find that individuals aim to achieve a spending profile where, under normal cir-
cumstances, old age spending exceeds 70 percent of average working-life spending in both
countries. Bringing risk into play, there is clear evidence that individuals do not want
to fall below a certain lower limit of old age spending. We use respondents’ answers
to calibrate minimum income replacement rates for each income quintile. For the U.S.
sample, these range between 100 percent for the lowest quintile and 50 percent for the
highest. For the Netherlands, the corresponding numbers are 70 and 60 percent, respec-
tively. Turning to the question how respondents evaluate risk-return trade-offs, we find
considerable heterogeneity within and between samples. For the U.S. sample, the 25th
and 75th percentile of the distribution for the coefficient of relative risk aversion amount
to 2, and 7, respectively. For the Dutch sample, they amount to 4 and 12, respectively.
Our results are useful in three respects. First, they help identify a benchmark of
adequate old age spending levels. In this respect, we view our results about minimally
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acceptable spending levels as particularly helpful. They can be used directly to infer
critical lower bounds on wealth accumulation. Second, our results can be used to offer
advice to uninformed individuals. Third, we may infer optimal contribution and benefit
levels for a mandatory pension system. Allowing individuals to achieve the minimally
acceptable spending levels identified in this paper would be a natural way of determining
benefit levels. Binswanger (2007) provides a simple framework that may prove useful
for analyzing how to achieve this by combining a funded with a pay-as-you-go pension
component.
In future research, our approach using an individually tailored and randomized survey
design for eliciting information on preferences can be applied in various other domains
that are important for policy. For example, consider information on individual prefer-
ences with respect to the trade-off between lower contributions to the welfare state and
higher levels of risk borne by private individuals. Such information is relevant for the
identification of a desirable design of social policy as well as of desirable macroeconomic
policies. Carefully elicited information on people’s preferences will stimulate the interac-
tion between theoretical and empirical researchers, will make the policy discourse richer,
and may ultimately lead to better policies.
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Figure 1: The distribution of relative risk aversion for the U.S.
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Figure 2: The distribution of relative risk aversion for the Netherlands
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
ALP CP
Mean Median Standard deviation Mean Median Standard deviation
Age 51.04 52 14.29 50.40 51 16.10
Income 5,000 4,521 6,001 2,419 2,250 1,612
Total gross wealth 507,409 345,113 632,613 228,756 206,725 228,138
Single 0.21 0 0.41 0.21 0 0.40
Children at home 0.25 0 0.44 0.36 0 0.48
Home ownership 0.80 1 0.40 0.71 1 0.45
Retired 0.27 0 0.44 0.22 0 0.41
No vocational training 0.17 0 0.38 0.31 0 0.46
University degree 0.47 0 0.50 0.11 0 0.31
Note: Total number of respondents is 842 for the ALP and 835 for the CP. Income and wealth is measured in year-2007
U.S. dollars for the ALP and in year-2007 euros for the CP.
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Table 2: Options of expenditures profiles (example)
Monthly spending during working life (age
25 until retirement) in U.S. dollars
Monthly spending during
retirement in U.S. dollars
Option A 2,650 2,650
Option B 2,750 2,400
Option C 2,850 2,150
Option D 2,950 1,900
Table 3: Preferred spending ratios
ALP CP
Spending ratio Interest rate of Interest rate of
1 percent 6 percent 1 percent 6 percent
50 percent 5 7 4 6
64 percent 11 7 6 4
76 percent 17 14 22 14
88 percent 25 21 36 33
100 percent 18 11 24 23
140 percent 24 39 8 20
Note: The numbers indicate percentages of observations. Total num-
ber of observations are 787 for the ALP and 708 for the CP.
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Table 4: Median regressions for minimally acceptable spending levels
ALP CP
Constant 120.93 999.82∗∗∗
(548.30) (296.99)
Income quintile 2 878.67∗∗∗ 414.63∗∗∗
(203.89) (82.26)
Income quintile 3 1449.66∗∗∗ 612.12∗∗∗
(204.65) (87.19)
Income quintile 4 2015.86∗∗∗ 940.46∗∗∗
(208.34) (92.38)
Income quintile 5 3019.13∗∗∗ 1429.97∗∗∗
(253.66) (96.66)
Wealth quintile 2 -22.05 -80.74
(218.98) (79.36)
Wealth quintile 3 168.12 -38.88
(229.08) (88.44)
Wealth quintile 4 220.26 -11.50
(243.82) (85.99)
Wealth quintile 5 720.28∗∗∗ -0.74
(254.93) (93.15)
Age 32.67 1.70
(23.70) (12.03)
Age2 × 100 -26.03 -2.24
(24.64) (12.08)
Single -261.19∗ 52.49
(138.81) (77.81)
Children at home 81.64 -0.72
(133.80) (67.97)
Home ownership -48.93 39.65
(186.92) (66.71)
Retired 246.59 201.34∗∗
(174.40) (91.41)
No vocational training -181.52 -43.40
(171.31) (62.99)
University degree 167.11 -181.97∗∗
(121.54) (83.07)
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.27
Number of observations 591 576
Note: The dependent variable is measured in year-
2007 U.S. dollars for the ALP and in year-2007
euros for the CP. One, two and three asterisks re-
fer to significance at the ten, five, and one percent
level. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
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Table 5: Predicted minimally acceptable old age spending levels per month
ALP
Minimum spending Median income Ratio
Quintile 1 1,144 1,058 1.08
Quintile 2 2,002 2,344 0.85
Quintile 3 2,762 3,215 0.86
Quintile 4 3,377 6,384 0.53
Quintile 5 4,884 9,054 0.54
CP
Minimum spending Median income Ratio
Quintile 1 951 1,359 0.69
Quintile 2 1,327 1,835 0.72
Quintile 3 1,525 2,300 0.66
Quintile 4 1,852 2,875 0.64
Quintile 5 2,370 3,765 0.63
Note: Minimum spending levels are calculated setting age
to 60. In case of the ALP, income quintiles refer to the
Current Population Survey, not the ALP itself. Numbers in
the upper panel represent year-2007 U.S. dollars. Numbers
in the lower panel represent year-2007 euros.
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